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1. Introduction
In parallel with the new challenges the Chinese economy is facing, China’s
role in the global economy is changing too. Chinese outward foreign
direct investment (OFDI) has increased in the past decades, however, in
the last few years this process accelerated significantly. In 2012, China
became the world’s third largest investor – up from sixth in 2011 – behind
the United States and Japan with an OFDI flow of 84 billion US dollars
and it still hold its position (90.2 billion US dollars in 2013 according to
Chinese statistics). Several factors fuelled this shift, including the Chinese
government’s wish for globally competitive Chinese firms or the possibility
that OFDI can contribute to the country’s development through investments
in natural resources exploration or other areas (Sauvant – Chen, 2014,
pp. 141-142).
Although the majority of Chinese OFDI is directed to the countries of
the developing world, Chinese investments into the developed world,
including Europe increased significantly in the past decade. According
to Clegg and Voss, Chinese OFDI to the European Union increased from
0.4 billion US dollars in 2003 to 6.3 billion US dollars in 2009 with an
annual growth rate of 57 percent, which was far above the growth rate
of Chinese OFDI globally. While the resource-rich regions remained
important for Chinese companies, they started to become more and more
interested in acquiring European firms after the financial and economic
crisis. The main reason for that is through these firms Chinese companies
can have access to important technologies, successful brands and new
distribution channels, while the value of these firms has fallen due to the
crisis, too (Clegg – Voss, 2012, pp. 16-19.).
The aim of the paper is to analyse Chinese OFDI to Europe by presenting
its main trends, patterns and motivations with a special focus on the
impact of these investments in the EU and European countries, respec-
1Ágnes Szunomár and Zsuzsánna Biedermann are research fellows at Institute of World Economics,
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
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tively. In order to assess the role and importance of OFDI from China
towards Europe, it must be evaluated within a global context, taking into
account its geographical, as well as sectoral distribution.
After the introductory section, the second chapter examines Chinese
foreign direct investment globally, taking into account trends, patterns and
investors’ potential motivations when choosing a specific destination for
their placements. In the third chapter, sectoral preferences and global
dispersion of Chinese OFDI will be detailed, relating major investment
areas, recipient countries and regions. The fourth chapter will be devoted
to outlining Chinese investments in Europe. By detailing certain major
investments of strategic importance the authors will try to debunk myths
on China as a neo-colonial power using its economic “soft power” to
influence recipient countries’ political decisions. Chinese investments in
sovereign bonds or European financial institutions during the crisis will
be evaluated, too. The fifth chapter deals briefly with a new phenomenon,
Chinese OFDI in the Central and Easter European region. In the sixth
chapter the authors will conclude their investigation by arguing that
although the majority of Chinese investments are directed to the developing
world, European countries are at the forefront of Chinese OFDI to
developed countries. Based on analysed patterns and observed Chinese
preferences, the authors will try to formulate policy recommendations for
the attraction of Chinese investors.  
The authors will usually take into account foreign direct investment by
mainland Chinese firms (where the ultimate parent company is Chinese),
unless marked explicitly that due to data shortage or for other purposes
they deviate from this definition. Since data in FDI recipient countries and
Chinese data show significant differences, the two data sets will usually
be compared to point out the potential source of discrepancies in order to
get a more complex and nuanced view of the stock and flow of investments.
For Chinese global outflows statistics from Chinese Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) and UNCTAD will be taken into account and compared.
2. Trends, patterns and motivations of Chinese OFDI
As recently the Chinese economy is facing new challenges and its
economic strategy is transforming, the country’s global investment position
is altering as well, however, a bit more than a decade ago the amount of
Chinese OFDI was almost negligible.
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2FDI from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), from the Macao SAR, from Taiwan
or from any offshore tax haven will not be taken into consideration.
In hand with the “Open Door” policy reforms, the Chinese government
encouraged the country’s investment abroad to integrate China to the
global economy, although the only entities allowed to invest abroad were
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). The total investment of these first years
was not significant and concentrated to the neighbouring countries, mainly
to Hong Kong. The regulations were liberalized after 1985 and a wider
range of enterprises – including private firms – was permitted to invest
abroad. After Deng Xiaoping’s well-known journey to the South, overseas
investment increased dramatically, Chinese companies established overseas
divisions almost all over the world, concentrated mainly in natural
resources. Nevertheless, according to UNCTADstat, Chinese OFDI
averaged only 453 million US dollars per year between 1982 and 1989
and 2.3 billion between 1990 and 1999. 
In 2000, before joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
Chinese government initiated the go global or zou chu qu policy, which
was aimed to encourage domestic companies to become globally
competitive. They introduced new policies to induce firms to engage in
overseas activities in specific industries, notably in trade-related activities.
In 2001 this encouragement was integrated and formalized within the 10th
five-year plan, which also echoed the importance of the go global policy
(Buckley et al 2008). This policy shift was part of the continuing reform
and liberalization of the Chinese economy and also reflected Chinese
government’s desire to create internationally competitive and well-known
companies and brands. Both the 11th and 12ndfive-year plan stressed again
the importance of promoting and expanding OFDI, which became one
of the main elements of China’s new development strategy.
Chinese OFDI has steadily increased in the last decade (see Figure 1.),
particularly after 2008, due to the above-mentioned policy shift and the
changes in global economic conditions, that is, the global economic and
financial crisis. The crisis brought more overseas opportunities to Chinese
companies to raise their share in the world economy as the number of
ailing or financially distressed firms has increased (Artner, 2010, p 933).
While OFDI from the developed world decreased in several countries
because of the recent global financial crisis, Chinese outward investments
increased even greater: between 2007 and 2011, OFDI from developed
countries dropped by 32 percent, while China’s grew by 189 percent
(He-Wang, 2014, p. 4; UNCTAD 2012). According to the World
Investment Report 2013, in the ranks of top investors, China moved up
from the sixth to the third largest investor in 2012, after the United States
and Japan – and the largest among developing countries –as outflows from
China continued to grow, reaching a record level of 84 billion US dollars
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in 2012. Thanks largely to this rapid increase of China’s outward FDI in
recent years, China also became the most promising source of FDI when
analysed FDI prospects by home region (UNCTAD 2013, p. 21). 
Figure 1. China’s outward FDI flows, 1991-2013 (USD billion)
Source of chart data: Data for 1991-2013 are from UNCTAD’s FDI/TNC database,
available at http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ (the data before 2006 doesn’t include
financial OFDI, that is, OFDI in financial services). Data for 2013 is the estimation
of UNCTAD’s Global Investment Trends Monitor, available at
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2014d5_en.pdf, which includes
financial FDI outflows. According to MOFCOM, Chinese OFDI increased to 90,2
billion US dollars in 2013, however, this data excludes financial FDI flows.
According to MOFCOM statistics, Chinese companies invested overseas
in 5090 enterprises, in 156 countries and regions in 2013. Chinese non-
financial OFDI amounted to 90.17 billion US dollars, up by 16.8 percent
over last year, of which equity investments and other investments were
72.77 billion, accounting for 80.7 percent, and earnings reinvested were
17.4 billion, accounting for 19.3 percent. As of the end of 2013, China’s
non-financial direct investment overseas totaled 525.7 billion US dollars.
While more and more Chinese companies are investing overseas, Chinese
OFDI raises concerns and therefore causes strengthening protectionism
against it, especially in the developed world. Several experts believe that
Chinese OFDI could be greater if host countries were more hospitable.
According to He and Wang, there are several reasons for that:
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1. state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the dominant players in Chinese
OFDI and they are often viewed as a threat for market competition as
they supported by the Chinese government;
2. foreign companies often complain that Chinese companies may displace
local companies from the market as they bring technology, resources
and jobs away;
3. there are fears about Chinese companies’ willingness to adapt to local
environment, labor practices and competition. 
Although the above-mentioned problems indeed exist, they are overe-
stimated as Chinese companies are willing to accommodate to the
international rules of investment (He-Wang, 2014, p. 4-5). According to
Scissors, if it is about national security, the role of Chinese ownership
status is overblown as Chinese rule of law is weak, which means that a
privately owned company has to face as much pressure and constraint as
its state-owned competitor (Scissors, 2014, p. 5). Nevertheless, it is worth
to differentiate between SOEs, which has two types: locally administered
SOEs (LSOEs) and centrally administered SOEs (CSOEs). Most of the
LSOEs operate in the manufacturing sector and they are facing competition
from both private companies and other LSOEs, while CSOEs are smaller
in number but more powerful as they operate in monopolised industries
such as finance, energy or telecommunication (He-Wang, 2014, p. 6).
Although the share of private firms is growing, SOEs still account for
the majority – more than two-thirds – of total Chinese outbound invest-
ments, however, the range of investors is broader, next to state-owned
and private actors it includes China’s sovereign wealth fund and firms
with mixed ownership structure. The role of SOEs seems to be declining
in the past few years, although the government will continue to emphasize
their importance as they rely on the revenue, job creation and provision
of welfare provided by the SOEs (He-Wang, 2014, p. 12).
According to the go global strategy, Chinese companies should evolve
into globally competitive firms, however, Chinese companies go abroad
for varieties of reasons. The most frequently emphasized motivation is
the need for natural resources, mainly energy and raw materials in order
to secure China’s further development (resource-seeking). Mutatis mu-
tandis, they also invest to expand their market or diversify internationally
(market-seeking) (Artner, 2009, p 1044). Nevertheless, services such as
shipping and insurance are also significant factors for OFDI for Chinese
companies if they export large volumes overseas (Davies, 2013, p 736).
Despite China’s huge labour supply, some companies move their produc-
tion to cheaper destinations (efficiency-seeking). Recently, China’s major
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companies also looking for well-known global brands or distribution
channels, management skills, while another important reason for investing
abroad is technology acquisition (strategic asset-seeking). 
Scissors points out that clearer property rights – compared to the
domestic conditions – are also very attractive to Chinese investors
(Scissors, 2014, p. 4), while Morrison highlights an additional factor, that
is, China’s accumulation of foreign exchange reserves: instead of the
relatively safe but low-yielding assets such as US treasury securities,
Chinese government wants to diversify and seeks for more profitable
returns (Morrison, 2014, p. 15-16).
Figure 2. The value and number of China’s outward cross-border M&A
purchases and greenfield FDI projects, 2003-2012 (USD million)
Source of chart data: UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2013 Annex Tables,
available at
http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx
Regarding the entry mode of Chinese outward investments globally,
greenfield FDI is continues to be important, but there is a trend towards
more mergers and acquisition (M&A) and joint venture projects overseas.
Overall, greenfield investments of Chinese companies outpace M&As in
numerical terms, however, greenfield investments are smaller in value in
total (see Figure 2.) as these include the establishment of numerous trade
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representative offices. The weight of M&A has risen steadily in the past
years: M&As accounted for only 18 percent of Chinese OFDI in 2003,
while nowadays it is around two-thirds of China’s total investments
overseas (Nicholas, 2014, p. 104 and Rosen-Hanemann 2009). Although
joint venture (both contractual and equity) as an entry mode for Chinese
outward investments accounted for the largest share in the 90s and at the
beginning of the 2000s, its role became less significant in the past years,
accounting for around 20 percent of China’s total OFDI2 (Davies, 2013b,
p. 71).
3. Global dispersion and sectoral preferences of Chinese OFDI
China’s OFDI has become more sectorally diversified in the past years:
mining and manufacturing dominated Chinese investments overseas with
a share of over 60 percent till 2003, the following years saw the growing
share of high technology, infrastructure and heavy industry, while the
sectoral preferences of Chinese OFDI lately turned to the tertiary sector3,
that is, to business services and finance primarily and also health care,
media and entertainment. Clegg and Voss point out that this progress can
be regarded as part of the internationalization process of Chinese
companies: firms from business services and finance follow their major
domestic clients or prepare their entry to the new market (Clegg-Voss,
2012, pp. 18-19). According to MOFCOM, in terms of industrial
breakdown, in 2013 almost 90 percent of the investment flew to
commercial service industry (leasing and business services), mining
industry, wholesale and retail industry, manufacturing industry,
construction industry and transportation industry (see Figure 3.).
Nevertheless, OFDI in natural resources will remain an important
component of Chinese investments in the future as Chinese companies
still have a huge interest in extraction investments overseas due to the
on-going urbanization process and the limited domestic deposits of most
resources (Rosen-Hanemann, 2009, pp. 9-10). 
As Figure 3. shows, commercial service industry (leasing and business
services) is the largest category of Chinese OFDI, however, the exact nature
of these investments is uncertain and it is likely that a large share of
these investments are redirected to the manufacturing or mining sectors
(He-Wang, 2014, p. 7). Wang tried to follow the final destination and actual
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2According to MOFCOM statistics, the outward equity joint venture FDI was 21.7 billion US
dollars in 2012, while the realized value of contractual joint ventures was 2.3 billion US dollars
in the same year. Its share of total Chinese OFDI was 19.4 and 2.1, respectively.
3For example, according to MOFCOM data, in 2010, almost 80 percent of Chinese OFDI was
destined to the services sector, 13 percent of total OFDI stock invested in financial services.
industries of Chinese OFDI by examining project-level data and found
that despite of the official listing mining and manufacturing are the major
attractions for Chinese investors (Wang, 2013). Another interesting finding
is that overseas investments in the manufacturing sector were mostly
made by the private sector and LSOEs, while investments in the mining
sector were dominated by CSOEs (He and Wang, 2014, p. 7).
Figure 3. Sectoral distribution of Chinese OFDI, 2013
Source of chart data: MOFCOM’s Brief Statistics on China Direct 
Investment Overseas in 2013, available at
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/press/201401/20140100463687.shtml
The sectoral distribution of Chinese outward FDI has varied between
provinces, while also the level of diversification between the above-
mentioned sectors are diverse among the various provinces or province-
level units (Davies, 2013b, pp. 50-51).
Regarding geographical distribution, Asia continues to be the largest
recipient, accounting for nearly three-quarters of total Chinese OFDI5.
According to MOFCOM statistics, Chinese OFDI to Hong Kong, the
ASEAN, the EU, Australia, the US, Russia and Japan reached 65.45
billion US dollars in 2013, accounting for 72 percent of China’s total
foreign direct investments overseas, up by 9.1 percent year-on-year.
Investments in Hong Kong, EU and Japan fell by 6 percent, 13.6 percent
and 23.5 percent respectively, while investments in Russia, the US,
Australia and the ASEAN reached 4.08 billion (+ 518.2 percent), 4.23
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5Within the region, Hong Kong is the largest destination, attracting 58.4 percent of China's total
FDI outflows.
billion (+ 125 percent), 3.94 billion (+ 82.4 percent) and 5.74 billion (+
29.9 percent) US dollars, respectively. The direction of outward FDI has
also varied between provinces due to geographical proximity (border
provinces), coastal or inland positions (access to world market) and wealth
differences. Chinese diaspora in South East Asia and North America –
and their province-level connections – also plays an important role in the
direction of Chinese OFDI (Davies, 2013, pp. 49-50).
Figure 4. Geographical distribution of Chinese OFDI stock, 2012
Source of chart data: MOFCOM and BBVA Research (BBVA, 2013, pp. 6-7)
If we analyse the geographical distribution of Chinese OFDI stock in
MOFCOM statistics (which identifies only the first destination of
investments), we can learn that a major part of investments is received
by Hong Kong and the Caribbean offshore financial centres: the British
Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and Hong Kong usually account for
the two-thirds of China’s investment flows and stocks. This high share
is related to a phenomenon called round-tripping. Round trip investments
are typically following the same pattern: a Chinese resident establishes
or takes control of an offshore holding company, and use this offshore
company to control a Chinese company by either direct acquisition or
captive contractual arrangement (Chao-Xu, 2008, pp. 1-2). In this case,
the investment is placed in a special purpose entity – a transit or
intermediary destination – outside China only to flow it back in the form
of inward FDI to China to benefit from fiscal incentives designed for
foreign investors. Round-tripping therefore might (mis)lead experts to
overestimate overall Chinese OFDI. 
Some part of Chinese OFDI to Hong Kong stays in the PRC’s Special
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Administrative Region as Hong Kong also used as a platform for making
further investments in other countries, especially developed ones. During
the examination of the actual final destination of Chinese OFDI, Wang
found that developed countries receive more Chinese investments than
developing economies: according to his project-level data analysis, 60
percent of Chinese ODI went to developed economies like Australia,
Hong Kong, the United States, Germany, and Canada (Wang, 2013).
Davies warns that an underestimation is equally possible if not attaching
enough importance to the growing role of private investors, who might
opt for circumventing the official approval process and use their capital
concentrated overseas (Davies, 2013a, p.757).
Being one of the top investors of the developing world, since 2008
Chinese investment increased substantially in developed economies as well.
Although this increase is impressive by all means, China still accounts
for less than 5 percent of total FDI inflows into the EU or the US. In the
case of developed economies Chinese investment are less dominated by
natural resource seeking or trade-related motives but more concerned
with the wide range of objectives, including market-, efficiency- and
strategic assets-seeking motives (Rosen-Hanemann, 2013, p. 69 and
UNCTAD, 2013, p. 46).
As Clegg and Voss note, the industry-by-country distribution of Chinese
OFDI is difficult to determine from Chinese statistics. However, based on
their findings, it can be stated that Chinese investments in mining industry
are taking place mainly in institutionally weak and unstable countries with
large amounts of natural resources and that these investments are normally
carried out by SOEs. Investments in manufacturing usually take place in
large markets with low factor costs, while Chinese companies seek
technologies, brands, distribution channels and other strategic assets in
institutionally developed and stable economies (Clegg-Voss, 2012, p. 19).
In developed economies Chinese SOEs usually have the majority of deal
value but non-state firms make the greater share of deals (Rosen-Hanemann,
2013, p. 71). In addition to greenfield investments and joint ventures,
China’s merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in developed countries has
recently gained a momentum and continue an upward trend since more and
more Chinese firms are interested in buying overseas brands to strengthen
their own. However, some attempted Chinese acquisitions failed6 in the
United State and Australia in recent years (Davies, 2013, p. 36). 
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6In the U. S. CNOOC tried to acquire UNOCAL unsuccessfully and Haier and Huawei also failed
to compound important deals. In Australia, Chinalco and Minmetals Resources failed to clinch
the planned acquisitions (Davies, 2013b, p. 37).
4. Chinese FDI in the EU: general overview, effect of the crisis
The European Union has been the major destination for foreign direct
investments in the last twenty years, with a preponderance of intra-
European FDI, extra-European FDI representing only about one-third of
the total sum. Compared to the aggregate, Chinese foreign direct
investment stock in the EU remains insignificant. However, regarding the
trends and dynamism of Chinese inward FDI, the economic “footprint”
and impact of Chinese foreign direct investment in the EU is indisputably
expanding. 
Although Chinese investors continue to breed anxiety in Europe, several
experts point out that growing European investments are simply part of
the going global strategy rather than a specific grand design related to
Europe (Hanemann, 2013). Hanemann also points out commercial reasons
behind most investments: the acquisition of rich-world brands and
technology to increase competitiveness, money-saving by moving higher
value-added activities in countries where regulatory frameworks are more
developed, or by acquiring firms cheaper due to the crisis or due to a
stronger renminbi (Hanemann, 2012). So the crisis only accelerated the
long-term Chinese strategy of going global and moving up the value
chain (Jonas Parello-Plesner, 2013, p.19).
According to Eurostat statistics, in 2009 and 2010, Chinese FDI stock
into the EU 27 amounted to 5.9 and 6.1 billion euros respectively.
However, in 2011, Chinese FDI stock reached 18.5 billion euros and by
the end of 2012, 26.8 billion euros (still only 0.068 percent of total stocks
held by the rest of the world in the EU27)(Eurostat News Release,
12/2014). The sudden surge is due to large-scale acquisitions in utilities,
consumer products, industrial machinery, and infrastructure. 
However, Chinese statistics show a similar trend, but different numbers.
MOFCOM has not yet released data for 2011 and 2012 when investment
trends became more dynamic and country rankings changed according
to European data. Chinese OFDI stock in Europe (but taking into account
European countries that are not member states of the EU like Albania,
Azerbaijan, etc.) amounted to 3352.72 billion US dollars and 6760.19
billion US dollars in 2009 and 2010. Outward Chinese FDI stocks in
major EU economies reached 1689.3 billion US dollars in the UK, 1523
billion US dollars in France, 1421.3 billion US dollars in Germany and
336.1 billion US dollars in Sweden (MOFCOM, 2010). Taking into account
MOFCOM statistics, in 2010, the flow of Chinese OFDI to Europe
doubled over that in 2009 (Davies, 2012, p.3).
In order to highlight the difference between Chinese and European
statistics, Figure 5. showsan illustration of Chinese OFDI in the EU in
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2009 in million euros according to Clegg and Voss, based on Eurostat,
NBS (National Bureau of Statistics of China), MOFCOM, SAFE (State
Administration of Foreign Exchange) (2011) data (Clegg-Voss, 2012, p.
23).
Figure 5. Chinese OFDI in the EU, 2009 (EUR million)
Source of data: Eurostat (2011b) and NBS, MOFCOM and SAFE (2010) available at
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Asia
/0912ecran_cleggvoss.pdf
A combined analysis of both data sources suggests that Chinese
investment in Europe is intensifying. It is more than probable that this
dynamism is just the beginning of a long-term process (Söderman-
Jakobsson-Soler, 2008 and Cui-Jiang, 2009). The European Union Cham-
ber of Commerce in China questioned a sample of 74 Chinese enterprises
that had already invested in the EU. They found that 97 percent of these
firms intend to make future investments in the EU, mostly even higher
amounts than before. (European Chamber, 2013, p.5.) However, unfami-
liarity with local conditions might keep some investors away from
European markets (Shixue, 2013): 78 percent of the above-mentioned 74
firms noted that they were facing bureaucracy and high costs-related
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operational difficulties in the EU and 48 percent were confronted with
regulatory approval obstacles (European Chamber 2013).
4.1. Bond purchases: is China willing to save the EU?
European markets seem more and more attractive for Chinese investors
because investing in Europe is perfectly in line with long-term Chinese
goals: gain access to a large consumer market, high value-added techno-
logies in a relatively stable, well regulated destination. 
The Eurozone crisis definitely attracted Chinese investors due to falling
prices. However, China is not willing to play the role of the Eurozone’s
rescuer, as some might assume. As Europe is China’s largest trading
partner and export destination, Chinese leaders throughout the crisis
voiced their support: a robust and financially stable Europe is in China’s
interest. Yet when it comes to define the actual size of Chinese financial
investments, uncertainty is prevailing. China definitely possesses the
means to financially back the Eurozone. Chinese foreign exchange reserves
reached a record 3.88 trillion in 2013 (Hanemann, 2014). But Chinese
willingness to give a helping hand is determined by its investors’ risk-
averse investment strategy. Actual numbers on bond purchases is
practically impossible to assess: China only publishes the total amount
of its foreign exchange reserves, not the exact composition. So China offi-
cially has never given data on its stake in public debt financing in Europe.
The other side, the European Central Bank does not track the nationality
of foreign investors in the debt market (Parello-Plesner, 2012, p.12).
Given the lack of precise data, experts try to resort to estimates.
The European rescue fund, European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
indicates Asian investors separately. Since EFSF ratings7 are acceptable
for risk-averse investors, it is logical to suppose that we can ascribe most
of Asian investments in EFSF issuances to China. However, in 2011 (its
first year of operation), Asian investors bought 40 percent of the EFSF
issuances, Japan (being transparent on its purchases) accounting for half
of the Asian total. Parello-Plesner’s assumption is that China accounts for
40 percent of the Asian total, 16 percent of all investors buying issuances
(altogether estimated at 5.6 billion euros). Another important assumption
claims China holding approximately a quarter of its foreign exchange
reserves in European bonds. This would mean several tens of billions of
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7EFSF has been assigned the best possible credit rating by Fitch Ratings (AAA). EFSF has been
assigned a 'AA+ ' rating by Standard & Poor's and a Aa1 rating by Moody's. EFSF has also been
assigned the highest possible short term rating from the credit rating agencies – Standard and
Poor's 'A-1+'; Moody's (P) P-1 and Fitch Ratings 'F1+'.  (EFSF Frequently Asked Questions, p.3.)
EFSF bond purchases. However, in reality, China prefers placing its money
in unanimously triple AAA-rated countries like Germany rather than taking
the risk of investing in indebted, riskier countries (Parello-Plesner, 2012).
The original plan was to leverage the EFSF up to 1 trillion euros using
outside financial resources, among others Chinese investments (Spiegel
Online, 2011). This grand design was never realized among others because
China was reluctant to play a more decisive role in rebuilding the EU’s
financial stability. Bailing out EU countries is difficult to justify in the eyes
of Chinese people. Why would Chinese pay for Europeans to retire early
when they do not have an adequate pension system themselves? Another
rightful question the Chinese population might pose: if Germany is not
willing to contribute more, why should China step in (Yongding, 2011)?
4.2. Chinese investments in the EU: sectoral and geographical distribution
China’s strong desire for success envisions the next phase of development
building on innovation and high and green technology. In line with these
ideas we’ve seen large-scale Chinese acquisitions in the chemicals sector:
BorsodChem became part of the Wanhua Industrial Group (borsodchem.hu,
2011); and the automotive industry: Rover Group belongs to the Shanghai
Automotive Industry Corporation, Chinese Geely Automobile Holdings
owns Volvo and Chinese also have a share in what is left of the Swedish
group Saab. Great Wall Motors Company has opened a new plant in
Bulgaria and thus became the first Chinese automaker to assemble cars
in the European Union (novinite.com, 2012). Romania has also been
attracting Chinese greenfield investments, among them a plant by Shantuo
Agricultural Machinery Equipment to produce tractors.
Chinese investors have also been active in communication equipment
and services, industrial machinery and equipment and renewable energy
regarding the number of deals. However, since these sectors are not so
capital intensive, the average deal size is smaller. Chinese have also in-
vested in automotive components, financial services and software and IT
services across Europe (Hanemann-Rosen, 2012, p. 40). With respect to
investment amount, chemicals, plastics and rubber, utility and sanitary
services, and automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and
components rank highest (Ibid., p. 41).It must be added that access to
resources remains of crucial importance in the developed markets as well,
illustrated by recent stakes acquired in Gaz de France and Energias de
Portugal (Bugge, 2011 and The Portugal News Online, 2011). 
Gao Xiqing from China Investment Corporation, China’s sovereign
wealth fund (CIC) claimed in an interview with Xinhua that Europe is
an optimal destination for infrastructural investments as well. These
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investments would suit the Chinese sovereign wealth fund’s strategy
since they require massive funds but have slower yields and European
governments have modified taxes and regulatory policies to attract
investors from outside in order to recapitalize their economies (Global
Times Canada, 2013). In line with that, in 2012, CIC purchased an 8.68
percent stake in British utility company Thames Water for 1.8 billion US
dollars, and it acquired a 10-percent stake in the operator of London’s
Heathrow Airport for 720 million US dollars. Another emblematic
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Figure 6. Chinese OFDI in the EU by industry, 2000-2011 (USD million)
Source: Rhodium Group / Hanemann-Rosen (2012) p.40, available
athttp://rhg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/RHG_ChinaInvestsInEurope_June2012.pdf
infrastructural project was the successful COVEC (China Overseas
Engineering Group) bid for the construction of a key highway meant to
link Warsaw to its Western neighbor Germany. This investment melted
into thin air in 2011 when COVEC failed to pay its Polish subcontractors
referring to soaring prices (Reuters Online, 2011).
“Trying to bring in Chinese workers was one of the reasons why that
investment went sour”, said Eberhard Sandschneider of the German
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) in Berlin. “One of the lessons
Chinese investors will have to learn is that they have to adapt to the local
market. And that means adapting to local laws.” (Spiegel Online, 2012).
The creation of a 10 billion US dollar credit line to support Chinese
investments in Central Europe is also partially devoted to infrastructural
projects (as well as new technology, and renewable energy). 
Another significant research element when taking a closer look at Chi-
nese OFDI in Europe is the geographical distribution of investments.
Chinese investment is very unevenly distributed among EU countries. The
top recipients of Chinese FDI are traditionally France, the United Kingdom
and Germany. These three countries have on average drawn 36.8 percent
of annual Chinese OFDI in Europe from 2003 to 2009 (NBS, MOFCOM
and SAFE (2010). France’s leading role is due to a mega-investment: the
Chinese sovereign wealth fund China Investment Corporation’s alliance
with Gaz de France in 2011.CIC paid 2.3 billion euros for a 30 percent
stake in GDF’s gas and oil exploration and production capacity. CIC also
bought GDF’s natural gas liquefaction plant in Trinidad and Tobago
(Financial Times, 2011). Without this deal, France would end up being
only the fourth most important host economy to Chinese money. The
United Kingdom ranked second with Chinese investments targeting mostly
the automotive, banking, real estate and infrastructural sectors, as well
as some mining companies with assets in the developing world (Hane-
mann-Rosen, 2012, p.37.).Chinese FDI in Germany concentrated mainly
in sectors of industrial machinery; automotive and transport; and
information and communication technology (Ting-Thiess-Tianlong, 2012,
p.23). This highly concentrated investment profile is probably due to
market size (the attraction of a possible entry to a huge consumer market)
since Chinese investors currently do not perceive the EU as an integrated
single market (Clegg-Voss, 2012, p. 24). High Chinese investment in
these countries is the result of “sound bilateral economic relations and
effective promotion of inward investment” (Clegg-Voss, 2012, p. 24).
In order to give a general overview of the main host economies in the
EU27, Figure 7. representsthe accumulated deal value of Chinese OFDI
in the EU27 between 2000 and 2011.
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Figure 7. Chinese OFDI in the EU, 2000-2011 (USD million)
Source: Rhodium Group / Hanemann-Rosen, available at http://rhg.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/RHG_ChinaInvestsInEurope_June2012.pdf
Chinese government sources refer to Luxembourg as the largest host
country of Chinese FDI in Europe. This anomaly is due to the Luxem-
bourgish business environment promoting the foundation of holding
companies in the country when the actual investment is targeted to another
country. (European Chamber of Commerce, 2013, p. 8). Cross-border in-
vestments often benefit from tax havens and offshore financial centers
on a large-scale, making it even more difficult to discern official FDI
statistics.
4.3. Urgent need for investment, fear of China?
European companies are in need of financial investors. Chinese investors
inject money to European economies at a point when most countries are
fighting mass and long-term unemployment. So Europeans are looking
for job-creating greenfield investments. At the same time, Chinese investors
prefer getting stakes in successful European brands with good reputation
or taking over well-established enterprises.  So far, it is too early to draw
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definitive conclusion about the nature of Chinese investments regarding
job creation. Usually, mergers and acquisitions neither created a consi-
derable amount of new jobs, nor laid off previous employers to repackage
factories end technologies to China (as predicted by some) (Parello-Ples-
ner, 2013, p.23).
The Chinese Ministry of Commerce paints a different picture, putting
emphasis on greenfield investments: over 1600 Chinese enterprises in the
EU have hired 50000 local workers. Rhodium Group also claims that
Chinese have a definitely positive impact on European labor market: the
428 greenfield projects from 2000-2011 created an estimated 15000 new
jobs. However, there are legitimate concerns related to spurring Chinese
investments in the EU. These anxieties stem from the exceptional growth
of China, the blurred character of state and private Chinese investors. State-
owned enterprises might be more subject to political guidance directly
from the Communist Party. According to Parello-Plesner, approximately
72 percent of Chinese investments in Europe originate from SOEs, but
there is a growing private investor activity. 
Chinese investment is often seen as a means of gaining a strategic
foothold in Europe. But why are we more afraid of China accounting for
only 1.4 percent of the total FDI inflow share in 2011 than we are of the
United States ranking first with an overwhelming 50 percent share in the
same year (Shixue, 2013)? The answer probably lies in the frequent
opacity of the investors’ intentions, of their relationship with the Chinese
government and Communist Party. However, European market actors
are also concerned regarding market access asymmetries. Since Chinese
public procurement process if often closed to outsiders, European investors
do not have the same room for maneuvering in China as Chinese
companies in European markets.
Public perception is also of primary significance: the increasing number
of Chinese mergers and acquisitions are often considered strategic
takeovers where Chinese FDI is involved in unfair obtainment of
technologies and knowledge Some also voice concerns over China’s
labor conditions and poor human rights and corporate social responsibility
record (European Parliament, 2013, p. 4). Chinese companies on the
other hand also have their own worries regarding European markets: the
lack of an EU-level uniform regulatory framework on requirements re-
garding foreign investments and the high administrative costs, as well as
strict visa rules and restrictive work permits might keep Chinese investors
away (Shixue, 2013).
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5. Chinese OFDI in Central and Eastern European countries
Although the Central and Eastern European region is not a priority target
of the intensive Chinese FDI outflows of recent years, since the turn of
the millennium Chinese investments show a growing trend here (see
Figure 8. below). 
Figure 8. China’s OFDI stock in CEEC, 2003-2012, (USD million)
Source: CEIC China Premium Database, 2012; MOFCOM 2013.
The main recipients of Chinese investments within the Central and
Eastern European region (CEE) – Hungary, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria
and the Czech Republic – differ in many respects, but they have some
common features as well. They have been in the process of economic
catching up over the last decades, their development paths are defined
mainly by the global and European powers, rules and trends and FDI has
a key role in restructuring these economies. Most of the above-mentioned
countries started to get more interested in Chinese relations – more pro-
perly in attracting Chinese investments and boosting trade relations –
since the new millennium, however, the economic and financial crisis of
2008 drew the attention of these five countries more than ever to the
potential of Chinese economic relationship. 
As mentioned above, Chinese investments in Central and Eastern Euro-
pean countries (CEECs) are still considerably small compared to all the
invested capital – or even to EU 15 – but gained momentum in recent
years and also played (and plays) an important role in the region’s recovery
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from the crisis. In the case of the selected countries – with the exception
of Hungary – there is a growing demand for attracting Chinese companies
in the last two to five years, while in Hungary this process has already
begun after 2003. Chinese investors typically target secondary and tertiary
sectors of the selected five countries. Initially, Chinese investment has
flowed mostly into manufacturing (assembly), but over time services
attracted more and more investment as well, for example in Hungary and
Poland there are branches of Bank of China and Industrial and Commercial
Bank of China as well as offices of some of the largest law offices in China,
Yingke Law Firm (in Hungary in 2010, in Poland in 2012), Dacheng Law
Offices (in Poland in 2011, in Hungary in 2012) (McCaleb-Szunomár,
unpublished manuscript).  
Typically, main Chinese investors targeting these five countries are in-
terested in telecommunication, electronics, chemical industry, transpor-
tation and energy markets. Their investments are motivated by brand
seeking, new technologies or market niches that they can fill in on Euro-
pean markets. The main type of Chinese FDI in the selected countries is
market-seeking investment: by entering CEE markets Chinese companies
will have access not only to EU market but also to markets of CIS, Me-
diterranean, EFTA (Wi?niewski, 2012, 121), and in interviews Chinese
investors also speak about the possibility of accessing North American
markets. In addition to that, there are cases of Chinese companies following
their costumers to CEECs like in the case of Victory Technology (supplier
to Philips, LG and TPV) or Dalian Talent Poland (supplier of candles to
IKEA) (McCaleb-Szunomár, unpublished manuscript). 
When searching for possible factors which make the region a favorable
investment destination for China, the cost of labor is to be considered first.
Labor costs are lower in the CEE region than the EU average, however,
there are differences within the region – and the selected five countries
– as well; unit labor costs are cheaper in Bulgaria and Romania than in
Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland. These differences don’t seem to
really influence Chinese investors as there is more investment in Hungary,
Poland and Czech Republic than in Romania and Bulgaria, however, an
explanation for that can be the theory of agglomeration effect as generally
OFDI in these countries is the highest in the region (McCaleb-Szunomár,
unpublished manuscript). With corporate income tax rate established at
10%, Bulgaria has the most favorable tax regime in the region. Never-
theless, it is the least popular investment destination for Chinese companies
in the selected countries.
According to Eurostat’s ‘Demography Report 2010’, Poland and Ro-
mania are the biggest markets in terms of the size of population (38,1 and
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21,5 million), while the others are medium-sized (10,6 million in Czech
Republic, 10 million in Hungary and 7,6 million people in Bulgaria),
although from Chinese point of view all of them are considered rather
small. Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary are relatively affluent markets
as well: based on IMF WEO database, GDP per capita is highest in Czech
Republic (18600 USD in 2012) somewhat lower in Poland (12700 USD
in 2012) and Hungary (12600 USD in 2012) but considerably lower in
Romania (7900 USD in 2012) and Bulgaria (7000 USD in 2012). 
In all of the above-mentioned countries there are investment incentives
for potential foreign investors, for example tax incentives and job creation
grants or ‘personalized’ advantages. In Poland there are special economic
zones as well, two of them dedicated to Chinese investors (Kielce, Kosza-
lin), while in Hungary there is a possibility to receive a residence visa
for a certain amount of investment (see the chapter below). Bulgaria pro-
vides full tax exemptions in areas with unemployment 35% above average.
Besides national government’s incentives for FDI, foreign investors can
also use financial support coming from EU funds for increasing
employment, which can amount even to 50% of total investment
(McCaleb-Szunomár, unpublished manuscript).
6. Conclusions and policy recommendations
Chinese outward foreign direct investment has been on the rise, and the
increase has accelerated in recent years: China seems to assume the role
of one of the world’s largest investors – reflecting its global economic
power. 
The Chinese government launched the go global policy in 2000, to
transform Chinese companies into globally competitive firms through
outward foreign direct investments. In line with this strategy, and parti-
cularly after 2008–since the crisis raised the number of financially
distressed firms and thus created additional overseas investment possi-
bilities for China– Chinese OFDI steadily increased. Another important
factor encouraging Chinese OFDI is the accumulation of foreign exchange
reserves: next to safe but low-yielding assets, the Chinese government is
looking to diversify its investment portfolio and seeks more profitable
possibilities. 
While Chinese OFDI in emerging or developing countries is charac-
terized more by resource-seeking, Chinese companies in the developed
world are focusing typically on buying themselves into global brands or
distribution channels, getting acquainted with local management skills and
technology, so-called strategic asset seeking. Regarding modes of entry,
investments shifted from greenfield investments to mergers and acquisi-
Chinese OFDI in Europe and the Central and Eastern European region in a global context 27
tions currently representing around two-thirds of all Chinese OFDI in value.
This shift is driven by the financial crisis, however it also seems to be a
new trend of Chinese FDI to the developed world, while greenfield in-
vestment remains significant in the developing world. Although host
countries would prefer the latter since it usually creates jobs, one cannot
deny the positive effects of Chinese M&As either. As several of these
mergers and acquisitions took place during or after the crisis to save dys-
functional and unprofitable companies from bankruptcy, they often saved
already existing jobs (or created new ones, too).
China’s OFDI has also become more diversified in the past years: from
mining and manufacturing it turned towards high technology, infrastructure
and heavy industry, and lately to the tertiary sector: business services and
finance but also health care, media and entertainment. Asia continues to
be the largest recipient, accounting for nearly three-quarters of total
Chinese OFDI, followed by the EU, Australia, the US, Russia and Japan.
Numbers might be misleading though due to round-tripping (the investment
is placed in offshore financial centers only to flow it back in the form of
inward FDI to China to benefit from fiscal incentives designed for foreign
investors). According to project-level analysis, 60 percent of Chinese
ODI is aimed at developed economies like Australia, Hong Kong, the
United States, Germany, and Canada.
As for Chinese OFDI to the European Union, the increase was far abo-
ve the growth rate of Chinese OFDI globally. A combined analysis of
both Chinese and European data sources suggests that although Chinese
investment in Europe is still insignificant compared to other investors,
but it is rapidly intensifying. The main reason for that is investing in
Europe is perfectly in line with long-term Chinese goals of gaining access
to a large consumer market, high value-added and green technologies as
the next phase of their development. Regarding investment amount in
sectoral distribution chemicals, plastics and rubber, utility and sanitary
services, automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and
components rank highest. As for geographical distribution, Chinese
investment is very unevenly distributed, the top recipients of Chinese FDI
being traditionally France, the United Kingdom and Germany.
The Eurozone crisis attracted Chinese investors due to falling prices.
However, China is reluctant to play a decisive role in bailing out European
countries struggling with sovereign debt crisis. Chinese bond purchases
were lagging far behind levels that Europeans hoped for. Since most
European companies, financial institutions and countries urgently need
capital, it is of crucial importance to attract investors from a country
where foreign exchange reserves amount to almost four trillion dollars.
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So European decision-makers on the one hand must address negative
public perception of Chinese investments where necessary. In order to
achieve that, the EU needs better FDI statistics, focusing especially on
the positive impact of Chinese OFDI (e.g. preserving jobs and creating
new ones). On the other hand, they must make sure Chinese investors are
ready to adapt to local circumstances by clearing requirements for foreign
investors and by creating an EU-level common investment framework.
Chinese firms are mostly struggling with regulatory inconsistency and
uncertainty across EU-member states. Bilateral investment treaties create
a large room for protectionist moves which is far from the common
European interest. Therefore, an EU-wide strategy should be elaborated
(and in the post-Lisbon treaty legal Framework, the EU is legally entitled
to realize that) towards Chinese (and other foreign) investors with uniform
requirements. Furthermore, the EU could incorporate inward FDI into its
own development plans, and make recommendations regarding the types
of investment and industry to be promoted and prioritized.
As we mentioned above, Chinese investors prefer „old European“ in-
vestment destinations not only because of market size but also because
of well-established, sound economic relations with these countries.
Therefore, investment promotion agencies (IPAs) should work on in-
vestment facilitation, such as clear administrative requirements, facilitation
of visa and work permit processes, etc. all over Europe, giving a helping
hand to Chinese investors unfamiliar with local circumstances. Clegg
even suggests Chinese firms may need “mentoring“ to explore European
markets (Clegg, 2013). However, IPAs often compete against each other
indirectly with different strategies, different opportunities and approaches:
some of them have a distinct approach on emerging countries, some even
have a China-specific strategy with Chinese-language website or local
offices in China. It is worth examining the possibility of regulating
national IPAs on the EU-level in order to avoid counterproductive effects.
Chinese investment in Central and Eastern Europe constitutes a relatively
small share in China’s total FDI in Europe and is quite a new phenomenon.
Nevertheless, Chinese FDI in the region is on the rise and expected to
increase due to recent political developments between China and certain
countries of the region, especially Hungary and Poland.
CEE countries might attract more FDI from China with new fiscal
(e.g. tax exemptions) and non-fiscal incentives. However, most of the CEE
governments lack a unified strategy towards Chinese investors. Hungary
is one of the few exceptions where in the spring of 2012 the government
launched a new economic policy with special emphasis on the so-called
“Eastern opening”. This strategy puts emphasis on developing trade (and
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technology) relations with China and other emerging countries, too. The
success of the strategy translates into an increasing amount of Chinese
FDI in Hungary, which is by far the highest in the region.
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